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In the Shadow of Judicial Supremacy:  





I aim to shed theoretical light on the meaning of judicial dialogue by comparing its 
practice in different jurisdictions. I first examine the practice of dialogic judicial review 
in Westminster democracies and constitutional departmentalism in American 
constitutional theory, showing the tendency toward judicial supremacy in both cases. 
Turning finally to continental Europe, I argue that the practice of constitutional dialogue 
there is reconciled with its postwar tradition of judicial supremacy through the 
deployment of proportionality analysis-framed judicial admonition. I conclude that 
constitutional dialogue may take place amid the judicialization of constitutional politics, 
albeit in the shadow of judicial supremacy. 
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The idea of dialogic judicial review has gained currency in constitutional scholarship.1 
Yet, the meaning of (institutional) dialogue in theories of constitutional/ judicial dialogue 
is not clear. Does it simply refer to the fact that legislature or other political departments 
respond to the results of judicial review? If so, there is little added value inhering in the 
idea of judicial dialogue. After all, each decision by judicial review is part of the process 
of constitutional politics involving different departments of constitutional power and thus 
subject to modification rendered by statutory changes or constitutional revision if 
necessary.2 If the idea of judicial dialogue is not simply an alternative expression for the 
traditional relationship between the courts, and legislature as well as the executive power, 
how do we make sense of it in terms of its implications to the political vs. judicial 
institutional dynamics in constitutional democracy?  
This paper aims to shed theoretical light on these questions by comparing the 
                                                
1 Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue between Judges and Legislators, 23 SUP. CT. L. REV. 
577 (2d ed. 2004.); Luc B. Tremblay, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue 
between Courts and Legislatures, 3 IN’T J. CONST. L. 617(-48) (2005); Andrew Petter, Look Who’s 
Talking Now: Dialogue Theory and the Return to Democracy, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: 
THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 519 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi 
Kahana eds., 2006).  For the deployment of the idea of judicial dialogue in the transnational 
context, see, e.g., Miguel Poiares Maduro, Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial 
Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism, in RULING THE WORLD? 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 356 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff 
& Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009). 
2 See Mark Tushnet, The Hartman Hotz Lecture: Dialogic Judicial Review, 61 ARK. L. REV. 205, 
209-15 (2009); see also Tremblay, supra note 1, at 644-45 
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domestic contexts of constitutional politics in which contemporary constitutional theory 
takes the dialogic turn: the emergence of the “new Commonwealth model of 
constitutionalism” in traditional Westminster democracies, the recent resurgence of 
constitutional departmentalism in the United States (US), 3  and the practice of 
constitutional dialogue in continental Europe. I argue that upon closer inspection, these 
comparative constitutional experiences show that the dialogic approach does not hold up 
in the face of the prominent role of judicial review in constitutional democracies. As 
more and more political and policy issues are turned into questions of constitutional 
interpretation through judicial review of executive/ administrative and legislative acts, 
contemporary constitutionalism has become associated with the judicialization of politics. 
As a result, with judicial review standing out as the defining feature of constitutional 
democracy, judicial supremacy,4 instead of departmentalism or judicial dialogue, is 
                                                
3 The departmentalist view of constitutional interpretation holds that “each branch, or department, 
of government has an equal authority to interpret the [c]onstitution in the context of conducting its 
duties” and “is supreme within its own interpretive sphere.” See Keith E. Whittington, 
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C.L. REV 773, 
782-83 (2002).  See also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 106-11 (2004). Notably, under the system of 
parliamentarianism, theories of constitutional dialogue espoused in Westminster democracies 
focus on the institutional relationship between judges and legislators. See also ALISON L. YOUNG, 
PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 117 (2009). 
4 Judicial supremacy refers to the position of treating the interpretations of the constitution made 
by judicial review as an integrated part of constitutional law and thus de facto or de jure superior 
to those made by other departments of constitutional power. Judicial supremacy hereby also 
includes the situation in which the power of constitutional review resides in special constitutional 
courts and extra-judicial institutions. Judicial supremacy is characteristic of what Tushnet calls 
strong-form judicial review. See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL 
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characteristic of the practices of constitutional interpretation. Moreover, the post-WWII 
practice of judicial review in continental Europe suggests that the idea of constitutional/ 
judicial dialogue centers on the deployment of “admonitory judicial decisions” to manage 
inter-departmental relations in constitutional decision making, which is another form of 
judicial supremacy. Taken as a whole, judicial dialogue and judicial supremacy are not 
contradictory; rather, judicial dialogue takes place in the shadow of judicial supremacy.    
II. AFTER PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY: TAKING THE PATH OF 
JUDICIAL DIALOGUE IN WESTMINSTER DEMOCRACIES? 
In this section, I first analyze how bills of rights in Canada, New Zealand, and the UK 
bolster the power of judicial review with the provision of new robust interpretive 
mandates. I then discuss the distinct features of this new type of bolstered judicial review 
in Westminster democracies and suggest that the practice of judicial review in these 
countries deviates from the expectation of the model of judicial dialogue and moves in 
the direction of strong-form judicial review instead. 
A. Interpretive Mandate and Judicial Empowerment: Bolstering 
Judicial Review in the Shadow of Parliamentary Supremacy   
The powers conferred on the courts by the bills of rights in Canada, New Zealand, and 
the UK can be classified into two major types. The first type is the authorization of 
judicial review by way of interpretive mandate, which is provided in Section 6 of the Bill 
                                                                                                                                
REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21-22 (2008). 
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of Rights Act of New Zealand (hereinafter NZBoRA)5 and Section 3 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 of the UK (hereinafter UKHRA).6 At first blush, courts are simply given 
an interpretive mandate to construe the statute in question in a way otherwise allowed in 
ordinary interpretive methods. Nevertheless, this interpretive mandate amounts to a form 
of (quasi)constitutional/ judicial review to the extent that it “gives the courts an effect on 
policy that is different from the effect they have using their traditional methods of 
statutory interpretation,” indicating what Mark Tushnet calls “weak-form judicial 
review.”7 Notably, compared to New Zealand’s weak-form judicial review based on a 
pure interpretive mandate, the new powers of judicial review in HRA are more robust.8 
Alongside Section 3, Section 4 of UKHRA authorizes courts in the UK to issue a 
declaration of incompatibility as to a disputed statute if courts are unable to interpret it to 
be compatible with the rights protected in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Convention),9 which HRA was enacted to incorporate into the UK domestic legal 
                                                
5 “Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning.” Bill of 
Rights Act 1990, s. 6. 
6 “So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and 
given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.” HRA, s. 3 (1). 
7 See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 18-19, 25-27. 
8 Despite the lack of an express authorization of the courts to declare a statute inconsistent with the 
Bill of Rights Act, the New Zealand Court of Appeals in Moonen v. Film and Literature Board of 
Review ([2000] 2 N.Z.L.R. 9) suggested the possibility of making a declaration of inconsistency. 
See James Allan, The Effect of a Statutory Bill of Rights where Parliament Is Sovereign: The 
Lesson from New Zealand, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 375, 384 (Tom Campbell et 
al. eds., 2001).   
9 Human Rights Act 1998, s. 4 (4) (Eng.). 
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system.10 Nevertheless, as the disputed statute is still binding despite being declared 
Convention rights-incompatible, Section 4 functions as another interpretive mandate.11 
The second type of power conferred on the courts in the Commonwealth model of 
constitutionalism is exemplified by the creation of judicial review in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 (hereinafter the Charter), which is an integrated 
part of the Canadian constitution.12 In contrast to courts in New Zealand and the UK, 
under the Charter, courts may set aside statutes if the statutes at issue are regarded as 
violating the Charter rights.13 Nevertheless, what characterizes the post-1982 judicial 
review in Canada is that legislatures may override judicial decisions through ordinary 
legislative processes. According to Section 1, the general limitations clause,14 the rights 
                                                
10 Human Rights Act 1998, s. 1 (Eng.). 
11 Sections 3 and 4 of HRA jointly constitute what Tushnet calls “an augmented interpretive 
mandate.” See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 27-31.  But cf. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 116; TOM 
HICKMAN, PUBLIC LAW AFTER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 82 (2010).  
12 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
13 The Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52. 
14 In their 1997 groundbreaking paper, Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell Thornton also discussed 
the role played by the provision of special limitation in some qualified charter rights (Sections 7, 
8, 9, and 12) in contributing to the emergence of a weak-form judicial review in Canada. See Peter 
W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or 
Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such as Bad Thing at All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75, 87-90 
(1997); see also Peter W. Hogg et al., Charter Dialogue Revisited— Or “Much Ado About 
Metaphors, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 3 (2007). Notably, their paper was aimed at contrasting the 
practice of judicial review under the Canadian Charter with the strong-form judicial review in the 
United State (US), suggesting that different constitutional designs in these two countries played a 
role in the distinct style of judicial review. Thus, they emphasized that some Charter rights were 
framed in qualified terms, which is distinctive from the absolutist style in which the US 
Constitution provided for fundamental rights. Along this line of argument, they also discussed the 
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guaranteed by the Charter are subject to “such limitations as are demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society.” Legislatures, federal and provincial, are thus allowed to 
respond to judicial decisions by reenacting the invalidated statute with a bolstered 
justification. For example, legislatures may proclaim in the preamble to the reenacted 
legislation that there is a better justification for the statute than what the court interpreted 
when it struck down the original statute.15 In addition, legislatures may choose to invoke 
the so-called “notwithstanding clause” of Section 33: Legislatures can make statutes 
effective for renewable five-year periods, “notwithstanding their inconsistency with the 
Charter rights.”16 Under the notwithstanding clause, legislatures can either preempt 
judicial review of the consistency of statues with the Charter rights by including a 
notwithstanding clause in the legislation, or override judicial decisions to resurrect the 
invalidated statute by using the notwithstanding clause at least for five years.17 
                                                                                                                                
equality rights in the Charter. See Hogg & Bushel, supra, at 76-78, 87-91. Yet, in terms of the way 
fundamental rights are framed and provided for in modern constitutions around the globe, the 
absolutist US Constitution is an outlier. See Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of 
American Constitutional Exceptionalism. 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 401 (2008). Thus, Hogg and 
Bushell’s argument on how the qualified Charter rights would move the Canadian judicial review 
towards a weak form is limited.      
15 “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society.” The Constitution Act, 1982, s. 1. Tushnet calls legislative invocations of 
Section 1 power “in-your-face” responses. See TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 31-33, 44. 
16 “Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of 
the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate 
notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.” The 
Constitution Act, 1982, s. 33.   
17 In its preemptive use, once the invocation of the notwithstanding clause lapses without renewal 
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Apparently, the three cases of judicial review as noted above are distinct from one 
another in terms of the powers conferred on the courts of individual jurisdictions. Yet, 
they share some features, which set the new model of judicial review in Canada, New 
Zealand, and the UK apart from the traditional judicial role under the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Under the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, judicial 
review in Westminster democracies was restricted to administrative acts. Statutes lay 
beyond the scope of judicial review. 18  Even in the limited situations in which 
parliamentary legislation seems to have been subject to judicial scrutiny such as the 
interpretation of the so-called “ouster clauses”19 and the conformity of the UK legislation 
with the European Community/ Union law, the exercise of judicial power and the judicial 
interpretation of statutes have been conceived as the means to achieve the legislative 
end.20 In this way, legislative intent is construed as controlling in judicial interpretation of 
statues and thus the idea of parliamentary sovereignty is preserved.  
Yet, with the new interpretive mandate provided by a bill of rights, parliamentary 
intent is no longer a controlling factor in statutory interpretation. Rather, by way of the 
                                                                                                                                
on the expiration of the five-year period, the compatibility of the disputed legislation with the 
Charter rights will be subject to judicial review. See Janet L. Hiebert, New Constitutional Ideas: 
Can New Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance When Interpreting Rights?, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 1963, 1967 (2004).     
18 See T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review, 23 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 563 (2003). 
19 A statutory provision that ousts the courts’ common law power of judicial review is called 
“ouster clause.” See IAN LOVELAND, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 77 (5th ed. 2009). 
20 See HICKMAN, supra note 11, at 65. 
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new interpretive mandate as provided in Section 6 of the Bill of Right Act in New 
Zealand and Section 3 of HRA in the UK, parliamentary intent can be pushed aside as 
judicial interpretation of statutes in light of the bill of rights defines the meaning of 
statutory texts in question. 21  Furthermore, judicial power provided in the Charter 
expressly authorizes Canadian courts to set aside parliamentary legislation if it is 
interpreted as inconsistent with the Charter rights, although the effect of judicial decisions 
can be modified under the conditions stipulated in Section 1 and Section 33. Taken 
together, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in these three jurisdictions seems to be 
preserved in form but rewritten in substance.22 
On the other hand, they depart from the prototype of judicial review that the US 
Supreme Court exemplifies. The underlying principle of this new type of judicial review 
noted above is that parliaments (as well as other legislatures) in the three Westminster 
democracies can choose to restore the disregarded legal meaning through a more specific 
redrafting of the statutory text in question. In the situations where judicial interpretation 
of statutes takes the place of parliamentary intent, the parliament is not strictly bound by 
the judiciary. By means of its ordinary legislative power, it can override judicial 
decisions. In the cases of New Zealand and the UK, given the statutory status of the bill 
of rights, the parliament can resort simply to ordinary legislative procedures to restore the 
                                                
21 Comparing the distinct impacts of Section 3 and Section 4 of UKHRA, Young concludes that 
“Section 3 tips the balance of power in favor of the court,” while “Section 4 tips the balance of 
power in favor of the legislature.” See YOUNG, supra note 3, at 129; see also AILEEN KAVANAGH, 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS 118-43 (2009). 
22 See KAVANAGH, supra note 21, at 322-24.   
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original meaning of the legislative provision that has been set aside by judicial 
interpretation.23 With respect to Canada, legislatures can challenge judicial interpretation 
of the Charter rights either by using the Section 1 procedure or by invoking the 
notwithstanding clause without going through the cumbersome constitutional amendment 
procedures.24 
B. Dialogue in Question: Emerging Strong-Form Judicial Review in 
the Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism? 
The dynamic interactions envisaged between legislature and courts with the installation 
of bolstered judicial review in Westminster democracies are most evident in the Canadian 
case. As noted above, in response to judicial decisions on the compatibility of statutes 
with the Charter rights, legislatures are empowered to use ordinary legislative procedures 
to restore invalidated statutes at least for five years by invoking the notwithstanding 
clause.25 Or, legislatures may choose to go by Section 1 of the Charter instead of defying 
the courts. In the latter way, with mere minor “tinker[ing],” legislatures can easily 
reinstate the invalidated statute in what Hogg and Bushell Thornton call “legislative 
sequels” without going through the cumbersome constitutional amendment process.26 
Together, the Charter adds new powers to judicial review by constitutionalizing the bill 
of rights without subjugating legislatures to the courts. Rather, legislatures are expected 
                                                
23 See TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 24; see also YOUNG, supra note 3, at, 116. 
24 See Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982; cf. Hogg & Bushel, supra note 14, at 82-91. 
25 See The Constitution Act, 1982, s. 33. 
26 See Hogg & Bushel, supra note 14, at 82, 84-87. 
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to respond to the judicial position on the meaning of the Charter rights through a kind of 
institutional dialogue. This is why the Canadian case is considered the paradigm case of 
the dialogic mode of judicial review.27  
As departure from the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, the dynamics between 
courts and the parliament in the cases of New Zealand and the UK also suggests the 
emergence of judicial dialogue. On the one hand, when the original meaning of the 
legislative provision is replaced by judicial interpretation that is given to make that 
disputed provision consistent or compatible with the Bill of Rights or the HRA, 
parliaments are not bound by the courts. Rather, given the statutory status of the bill of 
rights, parliaments in these two countries can override judicial interpretation through 
ordinary legislative procedures.28 The judiciary and the legislative are seen as conducting 
constitutional dialogue in the exchange of statutory enactment, judicial interpretation, and 
(potential) legislative override.29 
On the other hand, in the cases where courts are unable to interpret a statute in a 
way compatible with the bill of rights, the dynamics between courts and the parliament in 
                                                
27 See Hogg & Bushel, supra note 14; Hogg et al., supra note 14; Rosalind Dixon, Creating 
Dialogue about Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form versus Weak-Form Judicial Review 
Revisited, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 391, 393 (2007) [hereinafter Dixon, Creating Dialogue]; Rosalind 
Dixon, The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, and Deference, 47 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 235 (2009) [hereinafter Dixon, Charter Dialogue, and Deference]; Kent Roach, Dialogue or 
Defiance: Legislative Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions in Canada and the United States, 4 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 347 (2006). See also TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 31; but cf. YOUNG, supra note 
3, at 115; HICKMAN, supra note 11, at 71-81. 
28 See TUSHNET, supra note 4, at, 24. 
29 See HICKMAN, supra note 11, at 82; YOUNG, supra note 3, at 116-18, 128-32. 
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the UK and New Zealand also moves in the direction of judicial dialogue. In the UK 
context, under Section 4 of HRA, judges are authorized to make a declaration of 
incompatibility should they fail to interpret the disputed statute in a way compatible with 
the Convention rights. Accordingly, legal reasoning in court decisions is expected to 
demonstrate how rights-compatible readings of statutory texts are mulled over and 
exhausted before judges reach the rights-incompatible end of statutory language. With the 
rights-incompatible statutory language exposed and the meaning of the bill of rights 
illuminated in judicial interpretations, the public would put pressure on the parliament to 
revise the disputed statutory provision to make it compatible with the Convention rights, 
even if judges stop short of making a declaration of incompatibility.30 This is why in the 
UK context, commentators who advocate judicial dialogue have focused on Section 4 of 
HRA.31 In the case of New Zealand, the court has suggested that the Bill of Rights Act 
can be interpreted as conferring on judges the power to make a similar “judicial 
indication,” which “should be of value”,32 to the effect that the statutory provision in 
question is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act. 
Taken as a whole, the new model of judicial review resulting from the adoption of a 
statutory or constitutional bill of rights in these Westminster democracies designedly 
loosens the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty without turning into judicial 
supremacy. Judicial decisions are open to legislative reconsideration through ordinary 
lawmaking processes. The institutional interactions between legislatures and courts are 
                                                
30 See TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 27-33. 
31 See HICKMAN, supra note 11, at 86. 
32 Moonen, supra note 8, at 17. 
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expected to be more dynamic than that under traditional parliamentary supremacy or the 
US-style of “strong-form judicial review,” laying the foundations for the new 
Commonwealth model of constitutionalism.33 In terms of the possible exchange of 
institutional opinions as to the meaning of the bill of rights through legislative enactment 
and judicial decision, at least in theory, the new Commonwealth model of 
constitutionalism, the Canadian type of judicial review in particular, is further praised as 
the institutional embodiment of the idea of constitutional/ judicial dialogue.34 
While the Commonwealth model of judicial review is designed to reconcile 
parliamentary sovereignty with better protection of human or fundamental rights, a closer 
look at the subsequent developments reveals that the extent to which judicial review 
emerging from the new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism has broken with the 
mode of judicial supremacy is questionable. As recent studies have noted, the practice in 
these countries seems to deviate from this expectation.  
First, take the claimed prototype of judicial dialogue, Canada. A juxtaposition of 
Peter Hogg and his collaborators’ landmark studies of the Canadian Supreme Court 
decisions shows an obvious decline in the interaction between the court and the 
legislature in recent years. From 1983 to 1996, Hogg and Bushell records that of the 66 
cases in which a law was held to be in breach of the Charter, 53 elicited some response 
                                                
33 See Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. 
L.  707 (2001). 
34 See Kent Roach, Dialogic Judicial Review and Its Critics, 23 SUP. CT L. REV. 49 (2d ed. 2004); 
see also HICKMAN, supra note 11, at 81-96. 
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from the competent legislature.35 During the first fifteen years following the passage of 
the Charter, approximately 80 per cent of the decisions in which a law was held to be in 
breach of the Charter generated some legislative response.36 Yet, in the 2007 sequel to 
their 1997 study, Hogg and his collaborators observe that over the 1996-2006 period, the 
percentage of legislative response to judicial decisions declined to short of 61 percent.37 
Although during this later period, a majority of the decisions in which the Canadian 
Supreme Court held a law to be in breach of the Charter elicited legislative responses,38 
the decline in percentage (over 19 per cent) is undeniably substantial.   
Even if we focus only on the majority of cases that elicited legislative responses,39 it 
is hard to judge whether they can be taken as evidence of judicial dialogue in action. To 
do justice to the continuing legislative response in this regard, we need to distinguish 
between policy and law in constitutional cases. In the constitutional orders with some 
form of judicial review, whether it is strong or weak, a judicial decision that strikes down 
a law on constitutional grounds usually has great policy implications. In the wake of a 
successful constitutional challenge, the legislature not only has to revise the impugned 
legal instrument to make it compatible with the constitution but needs to address the 
policy implications by revamping the impacted laws. Yet, if the legislative response is 
confined to the latter, it seems to suggest that judicial interpretation holds sway over the 
                                                
35 See Hogg & Bushel, supra note 14, at 96-124. 
36 See id. at 97. 
37 See Hogg, et al., supra note 14, at 51. 
38 See id. at 52. 
39 See id. at 53-54. 
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meaning of the constitution, returning to the traditional division of labor between courts 
and the legislature under a strong-form judicial review. Thus, the legislative response 
alone is not sufficient to indicate the emergence of a new mode of inter-branch 
interaction in Canada. Also, it is noteworthy that no legislative sequel amounted to 
overriding the judicial interpretation during the same period.40            
Extending our view beyond the Supreme Court and taking a close look at “the 
critical and distinctive feature of [judicial review under] the Charter”, the notwithstanding 
clause,41 we will see how judicial review in Canada has moved away from its dialogic 
prototype. The legislative invocation of the Section 33 power has become a rarity except 
for its early controversial usage by the provincial government of Quebec. According to 
Barbara Billingsley, outside Quebec it has only been used three times in total,42 never 
above the provincial level, and not at all since 2000,43 meaning that it has effectively 
fallen into “desuetude”.44 Moreover, on those occasions when the notwithstanding clause 
                                                
40 See id. at 51-52 
41 See Stephen Gardbaum, Reassessing the New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 8 
INT’L J. CON. L. 167, 182 (2010). 
42 See Barbara Billingsley, Section 33: The Charter’s Sleeping Giant, 21 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS 
JUST. 331, 339-40 (2002). It should be noted that there is disagreement among Canadian scholars 
on how many times section 33 has actually been used. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy,  Judicial Review, 
Legislative Override and Democracy, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS – INSTRUMENTS AND 
INSTITUTIONS 263, 275 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 2003).   
43 See Billingsley, supra note 42, at 340. However, the insertion of the notwithstanding clause in 
the 2000 amendment to the Marriage Act of Alberta is dubious since the definition of marriage is 
within the federal jurisdiction. Goldsworthy notes that the notwithstanding clause has never been 
used at all since 1988. See Goldsworthy, supra note 42, at 275. 
44 See Goldsworthy, supra note 42, at 274-78; but cf. Billingsley, supra note 42, at 341-43. 
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was reactively invoked, it turned out that judicial interpretations of the Charter rights to 
which the notwithstanding clause was invoked as response eventually carried the day.45  
Notably, even with the notwithstanding clause in a state of dormancy, the inter-
branch dynamics between courts and the political branch in Canada may still be regarded 
as “dialogic” as long as a genuine “interpretive disagreement” takes place in the interplay 
of statutory (re)enactment and judicial decision in constitutional practice.46 Some scholars 
have thus incisively pointed out that due to the very existence of the notwithstanding 
clause, judicial review in Canada is more oriented toward the dialogic model than the US 
Supreme Court, especially with the legislative exercise of the section 1 power to narrow 
judicial decisions.47 Even taking this broader view, it is undeniable that the prominence of 
the notwithstanding clause in the Charter plays a pivotal role in the judicial self-
conception of the relationship between courts and the legislature, leaving room for 
legislative responses in judicial interpretation. Yet, with the power of legislative override 
in the notwithstanding clause gradually turning into “constitutional atrophy” as 
consequence of its continuing dormancy, the role that the notwithstanding clause has 
been expected to play in conditioning how the court positions itself towards the 
legislature could be further weakened.48 It may remain true that the relationship between 
                                                
45 See Billingsley, supra note 42, at 339-43. 
46 See Dixon, Charter Dialogue, and Deference, supra note 27, at 242. 
47 See Dixon, Charter Dialogue, and Deference, supra note 27, at 252-56; see also Billingsley, 
supra note 42, at 341-43; Rosalind Dixon, Weak-Form Judicial Review and American 
Exceptionalism, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 487, 495-501 (2012); Gardbaum, supra note 41, at 
178-83. 
48 For the normative implications of the long-term disuse of constitutional power for constitutional 
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courts and the political branch in Canada is still characteristic of the so-called Charter 
dialogue.49 Nevertheless, taking account of the development since 1982 as a whole, 
judicial review in there are strong signs that Canada appears to be moving in the direction 
of a strong form.50  
Second, according to a report of the UK Ministry of Justice, of the nineteen 
declarations of incompatibility that have become final in the UK as of July 31, 2013, the 
Westminster never disregards the judicial declaration of the incompatibility (with 
Convention rights) as to the statute in question.51 To be sure, against this statistical 
record, there remains no consensus that judicial practice in the UK has betrayed the 
legislative intent to install a weak-form judicial review.52 The controversy concerning the 
prisoners’ voting rights appears to defy the development recorded by the Ministry of 
Justice.53  
Yet, in terms of the UK government reaction, a distinction needs to be made 
between the decision made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and those 
                                                                                                                                
practice, see Adrian Vermeule, The Atrophy of Constitutional Powers, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
421 (2012). 
49 E.g., Hogg et al., supra note 14. 
50 See TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 52-66. 
51 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, RESPONDING TO HUMAN RIGHTS JUDGMENTS: REPORT TO THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO JUDGMENTS 2012-2013, at 
43-60 (2013). 
52 See Stephen Gardbaum, How Successful and Distinctive is the Human Rights Act? An 
Expatriate Comparatist’s View, 74 MOD. L. REV. 195 (2012). 
53 See Merris Amos, The Dialogue between United Kingdom Courts and the European Court of 
Human Rights, 61 INT’L & CONTEMP. L.Q. 557 (2012). 
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made by domestic courts. Considering the complex interaction among Parliament, the UK 
courts, and the ECtHR, the parliamentary defiance may be understood more as resistance 
to the adjudication of a foreign court than as reaction to domestic courts.54 Moreover, the 
UK government is still considering how to respond to the declaration of incompatibility 
made by a domestic court decision55 in this regard instead of simply affirming the 
impugned legislation.56 As it stands, the post-UKHRA judicial review also shows signs of 
an emerging “de facto judicial supremacy”.57 
Lastly, even with respect to the case of New Zealand, its record of balancing judicial 
review with parliamentary sovereignty is not beyond dispute. It is true that compared 
with the inclination toward judicial supremacy in Canada as well as the UK, New 
Zealand is considered “working reasonably well and as anticipated.”58 However, in the 
face of the lack of an express authorization of the courts to declare a statute inconsistent 
with the Bill of Rights Act, the New Zealand Court of Appeals in Moonen v. Film and 
Literature Board of Review suggests the possibility of making a declaration of 
inconsistency.59 Along this line thought, some scholars even suggest that it would be 
                                                
54 Cf. id. at 577-79. 
55 Smith v. Scott, [2007] C.S.I.H. 9. 
56 Ministry of Justice, supra note 51, at 57; see also KAVANAGH, supra note 21, at 282-83. 
57 See Gardbaum, supra note 52, at 200-01. 
58 See Gardbaum, supra note 41, at 178-98. 
59 Section 5 of NZBoRA stipulates, “Subject to Section 4 of the Bill of Rights, the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Relying implicitly on an 
expansive reading of Section 5, the Court of Appeals in Moonen notes that “the Court ha[s] the 
power…to indicate that although a statutory provision must be enforced according to its proper 
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difficult for the New Zealand Parliament to resist a Moonen-styled judicial declaration of 
inconsistency.60   
Notably, the New Zealand Supreme Court seems to have retreated from Moonen in 
its 2007 decision of R v Hansen.61 Yet, Hansen at least left unchallenged the judicial 
power to make “[an] ‘informal’ indication of inconsistency.”62 In the light of the 
interaction between the parliament and courts in New Zealand in practice, concerns have 
been raised over the conversion of the statutory Bill of Rights Act into “a full-blooded 
constitutionalized Bill of Rights” through judicial decisions.63   
III. AWAY FROM JUDICIAL SUPREMACY? PITTING 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEPARTMENTALISM AGAINST THE 
LEGACY OF MARBURY V. MADISON 
In this section, I take a closer look at constitutional politics behind the resurgence of 
                                                                                                                                
meaning, it is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights” (Moonen, supra note 8, at 17. See Allan, supra 
note 8, at 384. 
60 See Grant Huscroft & Paul Rishworth,“You Say You Want a Revolution”: Bill of Rights in the 
Age of Human Rights, in A SIMPLE COMMON LAWYER: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MICHAEL TAGGART 
147 (David Dyzenhau et al. eds, 2009). 
61 [2007] N.Z.S.C. 7. The New Zealand Supreme Court was established as the highest court and 
the court of last resort in New Zealand in 2003. It started to exercise this power in 2004. Prior to 
the establishment of the Supreme Court, the New Zealand Court of Appeals was the highest 
domestic court with the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London functioning as the 
appellate body of last resort.  
62 STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 139-40 (2013). 
63 See Allan, supra note 8, at 385; cf. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 214. 
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constitutional departmentalism and the call for a dialogic approach to judicial review in 
US constitutional scholarship. I first trace the appeal of the departmentalist resurgence to 
the recurrent debate surrounding the meaning of the Constitution and its interpretation in 
American history. Then I proceed to show that the latest call for constitutional 
departmentalism arose as the legitimacy of judicial review was called into question again 
in reaction to the progressive jurisprudence of the Warren Court. Finally, I assess the 
state of constitutional departmentalism in US constitutional practice and conclude that the 
practice of judicial interpretation in the US Supreme Court shows that the legacy of 
judicial supremacy set out in Marbury v. Madison64 endures. 
A. Constitutional Departmentalism vs. Judicial Supremacy: An 
Inconclusive US Debate in Quest for Constitutional Supremacy 
Concerns arose over the role of the judiciary in relation to other departments of the 
federal government in the United Sates as the US constitution was still in the making. At 
the center of this early debate surrounding the constitution was how to effectively 
implement the constitution with no single department of constitutional power emerging as 
the dominant enforcer of the constitution.65 To the Founding generation, while the 
supremacy of the constitution defined the government under the rule of law, how to 
implement the idea of constitutional supremacy through institutional design in the 
constitution was not clear.66 This issue became more complicated as constitutional 
                                                
64 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
65 See KRAMER, supra note 3, at 73-92. 
66 See generally THE FEDERALIST (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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interpretation was associated with the institution of judicial review,67 constituting the 
underlying theme of the constitutional departmentalism vs. judicial supremacy debate.68 
 Amid this debate stood the following issues. Was the interpretation of the 
constitution made by the designated institution of judicial review binding on other 
departments of constitutional power? Should interpretations of the constitution made by 
the judicial branch be considered integrated part of the constitution? Would it take a 
constitutional amendment to change the meaning of a judicial interpretation of a 
constitutional provision if the department of judicial review did not change its own 
interpretation in subsequent decisions?   
As the answers to these questions are not crystal clear, the debate surrounding these 
fundamental issues of constitutional democracy has remained unsettled. One position is 
judicial supremacy, the core of which is illustrated in the following statement: 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department—and no one 
else—to say what the law is. Once [the judicial department] say[s] what the law is, 
that’s the end of it. After that, no one obliged to support the Constitution can fairly 
assert that the Constitution means something different from what [the judicial 
department] said it meant.69  
                                                
67 See KRAMER, supra note 3, at 105-27; see also CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: 
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 74-75 (2004).  
68 See James E. Flemming, Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution 
Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1377 (2005). 
69 This is Tushnet’s paraphrase of Chief Justice John Marshall’s statement in Marbury v. Madison, 
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”  See 
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 6-7 (1999) (emphasis 
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On this view, constitutional supremacy, which is characterized by checks and balances 
between departments of constitutional power, amounts to judicial supremacy as the 
judiciary dominates constitutional interpretation.70 
It should be noted that the view of judicial supremacy never dominated US 
constitutional politics in history. Rather, as Kramer indicates, the departmentalist 
approach to constitutional interpretation, which purports that “each of the three 
departments [of constitutional power] has equally the rights to decide for itself what is its 
duty under the constitution, without regard to what the others may have decided for 
themselves under a similar question”, has a long history in the US constitutional 
development.71 As the so-called “Bank War” over the chartering of the Second United 
States Bank launched by President Jackson, President Lincoln’s ignorance of the Dred 
Scott decision, 72  and other constitutional controversies showed, constitutional 
departmentalism has continued as a countervailing position against judicial supremacy 
through US constitutional history.73 
 Even so, the history of the US constitutional development in the past century 
                                                                                                                                
added). 
70 See TUSHNET, supra note 69, at 6-7; see also FRIED, supra note 67, at 74.  For a discussion on 
the relationship between constitutional supremacy and judicial supremacy in the context of 
continental Europe, see ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICS IN EUROPE 34 (2000). 
71 See KRAMER, supra note 3, at 105-14 (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 140, 142 
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1898)). 
72 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
73 See KRAMER, supra note 3, at 207-18. 
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indicated the rise of judicial supremacy at the expense of constitutional departmentalism. 
While a “constitutional settlement” was reached between the New Dealers and their 
judicial opponents with the Supreme Court’s “switch in time” in 1937 in response to the 
looming threat of “court-packing” from President Roosevelt, the Supreme Court did not 
make an unconditional surrender.74 Rather, in this New Deal settlement, for issues 
concerning the Bill of Rights75 and the Reconstruction Amendments,76 the Supreme 
Court shored up its stand by reserving to itself the role of the guardian for fundamental 
rights in the face of the malfunctioning of representative democracy.77 In this way, the 
trend was set in motion toward the conflation of constitutional supremacy and judicial 
supremacy, culminating in Cooper v. Aaron.78   
This 1958 case was among the many judicial decisions by the Warren Court to 
enforce the school desegregation requirement declared in the 1954 landmark case, Brown 
v. Board of Education.79 To address the delays in desegregation and the intransigency of 
the state governments in American South in the wake of Brown,80 the Cooper Court 
stated that Marbury v. Madison “declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is 
                                                
74 See id. at 219. 
75 Amendments I-X. 
76 Amendments XIII, XIV, and XV. 
77 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75-77 
(1980). 
78 358 U.S. 1 (1958). See also ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 286 (1992); 
KRAMER, supra note 4, at 220-21. 
79 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
80 See BURT, supra note 78, at 271-86. 
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supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”81 Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court inferred that “the interpretation of [the constitution] enunciated by this Court…is 
the supreme law of the land.”82 On this view, alongside the constitution as well as federal 
laws and treaties,83 judicial decisions regarding the constitution constitute the supreme 
law of the United States.84 Viewed through the lens of the Cooper Court, Marbury v. 
Madison not only fathered modern judicial review but also left the legacy of “strong-form 
judicial review.”85 
B. Courts under Attack: Reviving the Departmentalist Tradition in US 
Constitutional Politics 
Although the position of judicial supremacy adopted in Cooper v. Aaron gradually gained 
currency,86 the legitimacy of judicial review was called into question again in the United 
States since the late 1970s. As the Supreme Court extended its reach to social issues in 
the 1970s, it fundamentally shook the foundations of traditional values, exercising 
enormous impact on the social fabric. Roe v. Wade,87 which legalized abortion, was the 
prime example.88 It was criticized as crossing the line of constitutional interpretation, 
                                                
81 Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. 
82 Id.  
83 See U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. 
84 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001). 
85 See KRAMER, supra note 3, at 221; TUSHNET, supra note 69, at 6-7. 
86 See KRAMER, supra note 3, at 221. 
87 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
88 See TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 32-34 (1999). 
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bordering on rewriting the constitution.89 As a consequence, the legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court and the supremacy of judicial decisions that rested on the New Deal 
settlement were put into doubt.90 After Ronald Reagan took presidency in 1981, judicial 
supremacy was confronted head-on.91 On the one hand, the progressive jurisprudence of 
the Warren Court was criticized as deviating from the original meaning of the 
constitution, stepping into the territory of constitution-remaking. To curtail the influence 
of courts through the purposive construction of the constitution, “originalism” and “strict 
constructionism” became the litmus test for federal judicial nominations under 
Republican presidencies.92 It is true that politicians’ attack on the judiciary’s final say 
over constitutional interpretation soon relented. 93  Nevertheless, the question of the 
legitimacy of activist judicial review, which has been the underlying theme of the debate 
on the methodology of judicial interpretation of the constitution,94 has since been drawn 
into the vortex of US constitutional politics.   
Paralleling the political criticism of the Supreme Court, some scholars have even 
taken on Cooper, emphasizing that the constitution only, not the interpretations of the 
                                                
89 Robert Bork exemplifies this line of critique of Roe v. Wade.  See Robert F. Nagel, Meeting the 
Enemy, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 642 n. 23 (1990). 
90 See generally BURT, supra note 78. 
91 See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987). 
92 See id.  See also JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN 
UNJUST WORLD 232-33 (2011). 
93 Larry Kramer notes that Edwin Meese quickly backed down after his departmentalist criticism 
of the Supreme Court in 1986 was soon accused of “inviting anarchy.”  See KRAMER, supra note 
3, at 221. 
94 See ELY, supra note 77. 
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constitution by the judicial department, counts as constitutional law. The goal of this 
conservative judicial philosophy is to restore the lost, original constitution.95 As the 
position of regarding judicial interpretations of the Constitution as part of constitutional 
law was disputed, however, the idea of constitutional departmentalism has resurfaced to 
challenge judicial supremacy. Despite variations on its meaning,96 the underlying idea of 
constitutional departmentalism is to carve out the space for “extrajudicial constitutional 
interpretation” from the court. 97  The political branches are advocated as coequal 
institutional players in constitutional interpretation.98 
In the wave of constitutional politics in the post-Warren Court era, the idea of 
departmentalism, which poses theoretical challenge to judicial supremacy, has been 
influential. It has appealed not only to conservative lawyers who were repulsed by the 
progressive jurisprudence in the Warren Court era but also to liberals who have been 
concerned about the conservative turn evidenced in the “federalism revolution” of the 
Rehnquist Court and its successor.99 Varieties of departmentalist constitutional theories 
have been proposed to support interpretations of the constitution made by the political 
                                                
95 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
(2003). 
96 See Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who 
Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004). 
97 See Whittington, supra note 3. 
98 Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the 
Law Is, 83 GEO L.J. 217 (1994). Notably, sometimes “the people” is also considered coequal 
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Johnsen, supra note 96, at 105, n. 1. 
99 See KRAMER, supra note 3, at 230. 
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branches, which differ from those declared in the decisions of the Supreme Court.100   
In addition to constitutional politics revolving around judicial interpretation, the 
resurgence of constitutional departmentalism benefited from an epistemic change with 
respect to constitutional rights. Taking account of the reality of cultural pluralism, many 
constitutional scholars have come to terms with the existence of reasonable disagreement 
over the meaning of the constitutional provisions, especially those pertaining to 
fundamental rights. 101 From this perspective, the different view each constitutional 
department holds of the meaning of constitutional texts simply reflects “the possibility of 
a range of reasonable specification of general or abstract rights.”102 No constitutional 
department is superior to its institutional coequal partners in constitutional 
interpretation. 103  Thus, constitutional departmentalism goes beyond an ideological 
confrontation with judicial supremacy. Rather, as the society becomes more pluralistic 
and the value hegemony falls apart, the departmentalist view of constitutional decision-
making sheds light on the way forward for the constitution. It is here where theories of 
constitutional interpretation in the US take the dialogic turn.104 
Invoking the idea of dialogue as the institutional metaphor to steer the relations 
                                                
100 For conservative departmentalist theory, see Paulsen, supra note 98. A systematic justification 
of liberal departmentalism, see KRAMER, supra note 3. 
101 See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 224-31 (1999); Frank I. Michelman, 
Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts, 66 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
102 See TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 51. 
103 See also YOUNG, supra note 3, at 128-32. 
104 See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 99-101 (1994); 
Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993). 
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between the political branches and the judicial department, constitutional 
departmentalism is reconceived as a better way to settle constitutional disputes and to 
make sense of the meaning of constitutional provisions, especially those regarding 
fundamental rights.105 Under this view, neither the political branches, the legislature in 
particular, nor the judicial department reigns supreme in interpreting the constitution; 
none of the three coordinate departments in the separation of powers system hold the key 
to the right answer of constitutional meaning. Rather, all three departments of 
constitutional power are regarded as engaged in constitutional dialogue through which 
constitutional disputes can be resolved without subordinating any of the coordinate 
departments to its coequal institutional partners.106 Considered the embodiment of the 
dialogic model of constitutional decision-making in comparative constitutional law,107 the 
post-parliamentary supremacy type of judicial review underpinning the new 
Commonwealth model of constitutionalism thus receives close attention among US 
constitutional scholars.108 
 
                                                
105 See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial 
Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (2004).     
106 See id.; see also YOUNG, supra note 3, at 122-28. 
107 Cf. Po Jen Yap, Rethinking Judicial Review in America and the Commonwealth: Judicial 
Protection of Human Rights in the Common Law World, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99 (2006); 
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108 See Dixon, Creating Dialogue, supra note 27; Gardbaum, supra note 41; TUSHNET, supra note 
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C. Constitutional Departmentalism in Reality: The Practice of Judicial 
Supremacy Endures  
It is true that constitutional departmentalism has been advocated by scholars of diverse 
political persuasions. Nevertheless, concerns have been raised that constitutional 
departmentalism may undermine judicial authority and thus chip away at the rule of law. 
Regardless of its controversial and sometimes unpopular decisions, the Supreme Court 
has commanded wide public acceptance of its overall performance, especially when 
compared to the political branches.109 Moreover, the public veneration of the Supreme 
Court pivots, in large part, on the general perception that the core of the rule of law, 
predictability and stability, relies on the final settlement of legal disputes, which is found 
in judicial decisions. Decisions of the Supreme Court are supposed to be final. On this 
view, the Supreme Court should hold the final say over constitutional interpretation and 
thus play the role of providing constitutional settlement to legal controversies.110 For this 
reason, judicial review evolves into judicial supremacy as judicial supremacy is viewed 
as laying the foundation for the rule of law. 
To be sure, the association between judicial supremacy and the rule of law is 
disputable. The idea of legal finality and constitutional settlement may simply be illusion. 
My point here is neither to dispute nor to endorse this notion of judicial supremacy that 
builds on the pursuit of legal predictability and stability.111 Rather, the fact that judicial 
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110 See id. at 234. 
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rulings command wide public acceptance has relegated constitutional departmentalism 
into sporadic pockets of legal academics.112 As Kramer notes , constitutional scholars 
have called for strong defense of judicial supremacy with concerns hovering over the 
unraveling of judicial authority as a result of the departmentalist view of constitutional 
interpretation.113 
Outside the ivory tower of legal academia, the prospect for a resurgent 
constitutional departmentalism is even dimmer. On the one hand, although government 
officials and elected politicians continue to question some decisions of the Supreme 
Court, their focus has shifted from the judicial role in constitutional interpretation to the 
substance of those decisions. The general acceptance of the highly controversial Bush v. 
Gore114 indicates that after the initial departmentalist confrontation on the Supreme Court 
during Reagan’s presidency, mainstream politicians have come to terms with the fait 
accompli of judicial supremacy.115   
More importantly, in the face of the vicissitudes of constitutional scholarship and 
political landscape, the Supreme Court has never subscribed to constitutional 
departmentalism either in the field of constitutional rights or in that of government 
                                                
112 See id. at 234-35, 243-46. 
113 See id. at 234 (citing Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer,  Defending 
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(2002). 
115 See KRAMER, supra note 3, at 231-32. 
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power. In City of Boerne v. Flores,116 a case concerning freedom of religion, Justice 
Kennedy in the majority opinion repeated a theme line of the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, noting that “[w]hen the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted 
within the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law 
is.” 117  Moreover, in declaring the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court further bluntly repudiated the departmentalist view 
of constitutional interpretation and reiterated its preeminent role in constitutional 
interpretation:   
When the political branches of the Government act against the background of a 
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that 
in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect 
due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations 
must be disappointed.118   
Alongside its interpretation of constitutional rights and the scope of congressional power 
under the so-called enforcement clause in the reconstruction amendments,119 the Supreme 
Court has also asserted judicial authority at the expense of congressional power with 
                                                
116 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
117 Id. at 536. 
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119 See KRAMER, supra note 3, at 224-25. In addition to the Reconstruction Amendments (U.S. 
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respect to the interpretation of the commerce clause,120 which has been at the center of 
the contested federalism cases.121 For example, when it comes to the issue of the 
commerce clause in United States v. Morrison,122 Chief Justice Rehnquist on behalf of 
five Justices emphasized, “No doubt the political branches have a role in interpreting and 
applying the Constitution, but ever since Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate 
expositor of the constitutional text.”123 Taken together, from the perspective of the 
Supreme Court, “it is the responsibility of [the Supreme] Court, not Congress, to define 
the substance of constitutional guarantees.”124 Defying the calls for a departmentalist and 
dialogic approach to constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court has posited “a 
strengthened version of judicial supremacy.”125   
The growing trend of judicial supremacy also exerts transformative impact on the 
political question doctrine, which holds that the opinions of political branches are 
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decisive in the so-called political questions.126 Traditionally, political prudence was seen 
to take precedence over legal argument in the political question doctrine.127 However, 
corresponding to the general trend toward judicial supremacy, the political question 
doctrine has only limited application of late.128 Besides, the decisive factor for the Court 
to decide whether to invoke the political question doctrine is no longer political prudence. 
Rather, it is the law alone that decides. Decisions on the issue as to whether to apply the 
political question doctrine amount to “an exercise in ordinary constitutional 
interpretation.”129 As Tushnet observes, “[with] the acceptance in [American] political 
and legal culture of a strong form of judicial supremacy,” the political question doctrine 
jurisprudence has grown into “a constitutional jurisprudence of boldness predicated on 
refusing to temper legal with political judgment.”130 The tendency toward judicialization 
in the political question doctrine reveals the reality of constitutional departmentalism. If 
the political branches cannot even maintain its role of constitutional interpretation in the 
category of political questions, it is hard to expect that constitutional departmentalism can 
succeed in resisting judicial supremacy in other areas of constitutional interpretation. 
In sum, constitutional departmentalism does not gain much ground in US 
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constitutional practice even with some enthusiastic support from legal academia. The 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in various fields only testifies to the solidity of 
judicial supremacy despite departmentalist challenges. The legacy of Marbury v. 
Madison endures as strong-form judicial review.131 
IV. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY REDUX: ADMONITION, COMMAND, 
AND DIALOGUE IN THE CONTINENTAL MODEL OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
As indicated above, the idea of constitutional/ judicial dialogue emerging from the 
introduction of judicially enforceable bills of rights to some Commonwealth countries 
and the revival of constitutional departmentalism in the United States converge on their 
departure from judicial supremacy.132 However, the practices of judicial review in 
Westminster democracies and the United States disappoint the advocates for 
constitutional/ judicial dialogue. Thus, in this section, I look beyond these common law 
jurisdictions, drawing up the experience of judicial review in the civil law countries, 
continental Europe in particular. I first discuss the institutional features of judicial review 
in continental Europe and then proceed to discuss why constitutional dialogue has been 
identified as characteristic of constitutional politics under the continental model of 
judicial supremacy. I argue that two factors contribute to the perceived dialogic 
constitutional politics in continental Europe: a legal culture in which judicial reasoning is 
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framed by proportionality analysis; the use of special judicial techniques by which the 
efficacy of judicial review is the function of both admonition and command in judicial 
decisions. Considering that the efficacy of judicial admonition is guaranteed by the threat 
of judicial command in future decisions, however, constitutional dialogue under judicial 
admonition is conducted in the shadow of judicial supremacy. Finally, I try to provide an 
explanation for the tendency toward judicial supremacy in the light of the judicial role in 
contemporary constitutional culture. 
A. Looming from the Judicialization of Lawmaking: Judicial 
Supremacy in the Continental Model of Judicial Review  
The continental model of judicial review, a centralized and specialized type of judicial 
review, which has been attributed to Hans Kelsen,133 first appeared in Austria and 
Czechoslovakia after World War I. These seminal constitutional courts did not last long 
as constitutional orders in these countries were short-lived and soon plunged into 
WWII.134 Following the end of WWII, judicial review was regarded as one of the pillars 
in rebuilding constitutional democracy in postwar Germany and Italy. Judicial review in 
charge of what is termed “constitutional jurisdiction” was expected to act out the role of 
the guardian of the constitution as Kelsen had advocated.135 Decades later, this Kelsenian 
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type of judicial review has been adopted in many new constitutional democracies in the 
third wave of democratization.136   
Without delving into the complex and sometimes technical issues of institutional 
design and organizational arrangement, it is noteworthy that this continental type of 
judicial review has been designed to overcome the traditional theory of separation of 
powers in continental Europe. Under this continental tradition, judges were subordinate to 
the sovereign will of the parliament, while lawmaking and law application were strictly 
separated. 137  Against this backdrop, the core institutional design in the postwar 
reconstruction of constitutional orders in Germany and Italy was concerned with how to 
make the constitution an enforceable law against parliamentary legislation without 
replacing parliamentary supremacy with judicial supremacy. To this end, an institution 
specialized in judicial review, i.e., constitutional court (and other equivalents), was 
established alongside ordinary courts as the institutional guarantor of constitutional 
supremacy. Set apart from ordinary judicial systems, constitutional courts were expected 
to enforce constitutions through judicial review without turning the exercise of judicial 
review into judicial supremacy.138 
Obviously, the strategy of deflating judicial supremacy in constitutional 
interpretation by setting constitutional jurisdiction apart from ordinary courts is not very 
                                                                                                                                
HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR 70-85, 108-32 (1997). 
136 See FERRERES COMELLA, supra note 133, at 4-5; cf. HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR 
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137 See STONE SWEET, supra note 70, at 32-33; FERRERES COMELLA, supra note 133, at 10-19. 
138 See STONE SWEET, supra note 70, at 34-38; FERRERES COMELLA, supra note 133, at 5-6, 79-85. 
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successful. Notably, the style of decision, the mode of reasoning, and the composition of 
personnel of constitutional courts are modeled after ordinary courts. As a consequence, 
the exercise of judicial review by separate constitutional courts ends up being judicial in 
nature.139 Moreover, as Ferreres Comella observes, this continental type of judicial 
review has an inbuilt “‘anti-Bickelian’ bias.”140 Bickel famously pleaded the “passive 
virtues” as the judicial techniques for the US Supreme Court to avoid judicial incursion 
into policy-making.141  In stark contrast, Ferreres Comella points out, judicial self-
restraint, underpinned by passive virtues, is anathema to the designed robust judicial 
review of constitutional courts in continental Europe.142 
In addition to activist judicial ethos,143 constitutional courts are driven further in the 
direction of strong-form judicial review by their broad jurisdiction. Unlike the US-type 
judicial review, in which the jurisdiction of federal courts is strictly limited to “cases and 
controversies,”144 continental constitutional courts are tasked to provide guidance and as 
well as advice to the political branches as to in matters of constitutional significance.145 
For one thing, prior review is no longer inconceivable in the eye of the continental 
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judicial review. In some countries, it is even considered a better way to ensure the 
conformity of legislation with the constitution and resolve constitutional issues before 
constitutional challenges arise from the implementation of unscrutinized legislation.146   
With the mechanism of abstract review, prior or posterior, constitutional courts are 
allowed to focus attention on the legislative text without regard to actual factors. In this 
way, judicial review arguably engages with the political branches only on the general 
questions of constitutional principle at the abstract level without intervening in concrete 
policy choices in legislation. Through these jurisdictional devices of constitutional courts, 
there is an inbuilt inclination toward strong-form judicial review in the continental model 
of judicial review.147 
Moreover, constitutional provisions regarding fundamental rights are understood in 
a more expansive way than the Bill of Rights in the US constitution. They are not simply 
treated as the catalogue of individual rights. Rather, they are regarded as the entrenched 
textual placeholder of fundamental values the constitutional framers have enshrined in the 
constitution. These constitutionalized fundamental values are judicially enforceable and 
binding on the political branches, providing the normative framework within which 
legislative and administrative policies are to be decided.148 Going beyond the settlement 
of individual complaints centering on constitutional rights, the underlying principles of 
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the constitutional rights provisions empower constitutional courts to scrutinize the 
validity of legislation and administrative regulations from a normative perspective of 
constitutionalized fundamental values.149 
On the other hand, for fear of the voiding of their legislation by judicial review, the 
political branches, particularly the parliament, have to incorporate the assessment of 
constitutionality into the process of policy analysis in drafting legislative bills and 
making administrative rules. In the shadow of judicial review, debates on important 
political issues have to take into account the constitutional principles concerned.150 In this 
way, the constitution penetrates into policy making, underpinning what Stone Sweet calls 
the “judicialization of law making”.151 
B. Living with Judicial Supremacy: Constitutional Dialogue 
under Proportionality Analysis-Framed Judicial Admonition 
As noted above, it is a necessary condition for judicial dialogue to acknowledge that the 
interpretation of a constitutional provision or principle can be rendered in multiple ways. 
Yet, to make judicial dialogue possible under the prevalence of judicial supremacy 
further requires an analytic framework within which judicial review can define the 
perimeters of constitutional provisions and the underlying values without submitting its 
forthright position in the first place. Proportionality analysis provides the continental 
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model with such a framework of legal argumentation.152 
 Despite tracing its roots back to the nineteenth-century Germany, the principle of 
proportionality has become an integral part of European legal culture with its adoption by 
the courts through continental Europe and beyond.153 Of particular pertinence to the 
present discussion is its role in framing judicial reasoning apart from being a legal 
doctrine.154 What is characteristic of proportionality as a framework of legal analysis is 
that it enables the courts to pivot their constitutional judgment more on the context of 
cases than on the definition of constitutional text and the underlying principles.155 As the 
question of constitutionality evolves into one of justifiability of the tested legal means 
and is decided in the light of the contextual contingency of constitutional values in 
individual cases, the political departments can address the constitutionality concerns 
raised by the courts by recalibrating the proportionality of the means to its end. Thus, the 
courts can adapt their constitutional interpretation to new contexts, including the 
responses from the political departments, without compromising the constitutional ethos 
of judicial supremacy. 
In addition to the legal culture of proportionality analysis, a special set of judicial 
techniques emerge, leaving room for a seemingly dialogue-inclined judicial review under 
the ethos of judicial supremacy in continental Europe. Under the traditional doctrine that 
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a law declared unconstitutional be null and void ex tunc, declaring disputed legislation 
unconstitutional would result in a legal vacuum.156 As judicial review in continental 
Europe always takes on legislative policies beyond the scope of individual complaints, 
one central issue has been how to confine the effect of judicial review. In response, 
constitutional courts in continental Europe have developed different techniques in their 
judicial decisions under the rubric of “admonitory decisions” to lessen the impact of the 
declaration of unconstitutionality with respect to disputed legislation.157   
Through the deployment of judicial admonition, the continental model has managed 
to play a balanced role in safeguarding the constitution. In some cases, constitutional 
courts declare the disputed legislation unconstitutional without setting it aside 
immediately. In this way, it allows the legislature to revise the legislation and to make it 
consistent with the constitution but at the same time avoids the possible legal void. If the 
legislature fails to respond to this judicial decision, the constitutional court can add 
pressure on the political departments by declaring the unrevised legislation 
unconstitutional and thus null and void in the next constitutional litigation.158 In others, 
constitutional courts postpone the effect of their declaration of unconstitutionality by 
setting a time limit on the repeal of the disputed legislation. After the expiration of this 
time limit, the disputed legislation, which has been declared unconstitutional, will be 
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regarded as having been repealed automatically. By doing so, the constitutional court 
allows the legislature to make necessary transitional arrangements.159   
In some other cases, constitutional courts simply decide on constitutional principles 
and indicate the direction in which policies should be pursued to fulfill constitutional 
requirements without undertaking a substantive scrutiny of legislation at issue. In this 
way, the legislature is left with discretion to decide on concrete measures in furtherance 
of constitutional values.160 Notably, in this situation, legislative choices do not preempt 
judicial review of their constitutionality. Judicial review may revisit the underlying 
constitutional issue of the new legislative choice in future constitutional litigation. If 
judicial review finds the new legislation still falling short in fulfilling constitutional 
requirements, it may strike it down. In sum, the constitutional court “admonishes” the 
political departments of constitutional values and of the way the legislation under review 
can be changed to consist with the constitution.  
In the light of these various admonitory judicial decisions, the continental model is 
praised as brining constitutional values to ordinary lawmaking processes, deepening the 
constitutionalization of policy-making and political debates. 161  Backed by judicial 
admonition, constitutional values become the reference point for policy-making and 
political debates within and beyond the parliamentary hall. On the other hand, judicial 
                                                
159 See Zeidler, supra note 156, at 517. 
160 See id. at 511-13; WOJCIECH SADURSKI, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 153 (2002). 
161 See FERRERES COMELLA, supra note 133, at 55-70; STONE SWEET, supra note 70, at 194-294. 
 44 
review leaves the political departments the liberty to make concrete policy choices. 
Judicial admonition enables constitutional courts to exercise effective judicial review 
without making unnecessary incursion into the area of policy-making.162 As a result, 
institutional conversations on constitutional values are seen to flow between 
constitutional courts and policy makers, spilling over into the civic debate on public 
issues.163 On this view, constitutional politics between judicial review and the political 
departments reflects the idea of constitutional/ judicial dialogue. 
Yet, it should be noted that the judicial declarations of constitutional principles do 
not succeed in “nudging” the political branches toward making policy legislation 
consistent with the constitution simply through admonition. Once judicial admonition 
does not work, constitutional courts can easily change tack. Specifically, if the political 
departments fail to fully implement the constitutional requirements as laid out in an 
admonitory decision, judicial review will turn to the tactic of judicial command, striking 
down the disputed policy legislation in a sequel to its prior judicial admonition.164 
Moreover, some judicial decisions penetrate deep into the core of policy legislation 
despite seemingly taking the form of judicial admonition.165 Along this development of 
penetrating and exacting judicial scrutiny, the continental model of judicial review has 
evolved into judicial management of policy choices by way of judicial admonitions.166 
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Even with respect to the residual discretion of the political departments in the 
implementation of constitutional principles, it remains doubtful whether the interaction 
between judicial review and the political departments is indeed dialogic. As Tushnet 
perceptively points out, for the dialogic mode of judicial review to function, there must 
exist a particular politico-legal culture in which “the possibility of a range of reasonable 
specification of general or abstract rights” is accepted.167 If a correct meaning is believed 
to materialize in the interpretation of general fundamental rights, there will be no room 
for a genuine dialogic model of judicial review. Yet, as the practices in the continental 
model of judicial review indicate, a distinction is assumed between matters of 
constitutional principles and those of policy choices, while the former is reserved for 
judicial review.168 On this view, it is in the constitutional court, not the political 
departments, where the correct meaning of constitutional provisions is believed to 
materialize.169 Moreover, the question of whether conflicting principles in individual 
cases, which lie at the heart of proportionality analysis, are rightly balanced, is reserved 
for the constitutional court, regardless of its context-sensitive character.170 Thus, while 
there seems to be dialogic interaction between the political departments and constitutional 
courts, a closer look reveals that underlying judicial admonition in the continental model 
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is the idea of judicial supremacy.171  
C. Looking beyond the Continent: Constitutional Dialogue, Judicial 
Supremacy, and the Judicialization of Constitutional Politics   
The reason why the legal culture in continental Europe evolves into trusting the 
interpretation of constitutional principles with judicial review is complicated. However, 
together with the practices in the United States and the Commonwealth countries of 
Canada, New Zealand, and the UK as shown above, the general development of judicial 
review in the landscape of comparative constitutional law seems to move closer to 
judicial supremacy than to constitutional/ judicial dialogue.172 It is too complex for the 
present paper to adequately address how this trend toward judicial supremacy has taken 
roots in such diverse jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the experience of the continental model 
of judicial review illustrates why the idea of constitutional/ judicial dialogue fails to 
withstand the trend toward judicial supremacy. 
 As noted above, the judicialization of lawmaking results from the penetration of the 
constitution into policy-making by judicial review. This development reflects one of the 
features of the contemporary expansion of constitutionalism. Judicial review is expected 
to play a role beyond settling disputes in individual cases or controversies as expected of 
traditional judges. Rather, it is also expected to lay out the fundamental constitutional 
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principles through its rulings.173 For this reason, judicial decisions on highly contested 
constitutional issues read more like essays on social justice and political philosophy than 
ordinary adjudications.174 Setting out the fundamental principles, these judicial decisions 
provide the framework within which constitutional values are to be balanced and 
institutional designs are to be hammered out.175 In this way, government policies are 
reconstructed in constitutional terms set out by judicial review.  
The judicialization of lawmaking not only drives the constitutionalization of politics 
but also contributes to the rise of “juristocracy” as judicial review gradually plays a 
managerial role in projecting constitutional values into detailed institutional designs.176 
Moreover, the inclination toward seeking constitutional guidance from judicial review 
echoes what Tushnet observes of the truncated attempts to substitute dialogic judicial for 
strong-form judicial review.177 In the present legal culture, the law and the court are 
intertwined and judicial judgments are treated as resulting from deliberations on 
principle. In contrast, policy choices of the political branches are regarded as decisions 
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out of expediency. Viewed in this light, it is hard to conceive of resting the legal 
interpretation of constitutional rights and their underlying principles with the political 
branches.178  
Take the post-1982 judicial review in Canada again. Some scholars have argued that 
the practice of Canadian judicial review reflects the dialogic model of judicial review 
because of the high-percentage judicial endorsement of the so-called “legislative 
sequels.”179 However, the fact that judicial review “endorses” legislative sequels can be 
interpreted either as judicial deference to the legislative reconsideration of constitutional 
principles or as the approval of the legislative concretization of constitutional rights by 
judicial review: the former points to judicial dialogue; the latter suggests judicial 
supremacy. Notably, dialogue-leaning scholars tend to focus on the surface disagreement 
on constitutional interpretation between judicial review and the political branches as 
indicated in the exchange of legislative enactment, judicial decision, legislative sequel, 
and the judicial second look.180 Yet, once we step out of the ivory tower of constitutional 
scholars, the reality may not be as rosy as the advocates for dialogic judicial review have 
portrayed. Rather, in light of the general legal culture, the legislative reconsideration of 
the judicial declaration of constitutional principles may well be regarded by the public as 
a political defiance of judicial decisions rather than an institutional dialogue over the 
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meaning of constitutional provisions.181   
In contemporary legal culture, courts are likely to move to the institutional center in 
constitutional decision-making, tipping the constitutional separation of powers system 
toward judicial supremacy.182 The emergence of judicial supremacy in diverse legal 
jurisdictions bears witness to the prominence of the judicial role in the implementation of 
the idea of the rule of law and the belief in the objectivity of rights in contemporary 
political-legal culture.183   
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have tried to shed light on the dialogic turn in contemporary constitutional 
theory by comparing the domestic contexts of constitutional politics in different 
jurisdictions. I first discussed the supposed emergence of dialogic judicial review with the 
adoption of bills of rights in Canada, New Zealand, and the UK and the recent resurge of 
supposedly dialogic constitutional departmentalism in the United States. Both take shape 
in reaction to a certain type of institutional supremacy in constitutional decision-making. 
While the Commonwealth model of judicial review is designed to reconcile 
parliamentary sovereignty with the better protection of human or fundamental rights, 
constitutional departmentalism responds to judicial supremacy in the United States. A 
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closer look at subsequent developments in these jurisdictions reveals that the dynamics of 
constitutional politics in these two examples is less dialogic than anticipated. A move 
toward strong-form judicial review has emerged in the Commonwealth jurisdictions 
discussed above; the supposed resurgence of departmentalism has failed to make a dent in 
the enduring legacy of Marbury v. Madison and strong-form judicial review in the United 
States. 
To understand the phenomenon of judicial supremacy better, I continued to draw 
inspiration from the experience of constitutional/ judicial review in continental Europe, 
which has been characterized as the exemplar of the idea of constitutional dialogue in the 
face of its postwar tradition of judicial supremacy. I argued that the postwar tradition of 
judicial supremacy and the seeming practice of constitutional dialogue in continental 
Europe have been reconciled through the deployment of judicial admonition. I further 
suggested that this development needs to be understood in light of the prominent role of 
the judiciary and the general trend toward a judicialization of constitutional politics in 
contemporary legal culture.  
To conclude, comparative constitutional experience shows that the dialogic 
approach underpinned by a departmentalist view of constitutional meaning does not hold 
up in the face of the prominent role of judicial review in constitutional democracies. With 
judicial review standing out as the defining feature of constitutional democracy, the 
practice of constitutional interpretation is entwined with the judicialization of politics as 
more and more political and policy issues are turned into questions of constitutional 
interpretation through judicial review of executive/ administrative and legislative acts. As 
a result, judicial supremacy instead of constitutional departmentalism characterizes the 
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practice of constitutional interpretation. As suggested in admonitory judicial decisions in 
the continental type of judicial review, constitutional dialogue may take place in the face 
of the judicialization of constitutional politics, but only in the shadow of judicial 
supremacy. 
